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Keller, Godfrey
Rady, Sven
Year of Publication: 
Series/Report no.: 
SFB/TR 15 Discussion Paper No. 520
We analyze continuous-time games of strategic experimentation with two-armedbandits when there is no discounting. We show that for all specifications of priorbeliefs and payoff-generating processes that satisfy some separability condition, the unique symmetric Markov perfect equilibrium can be computed in a simple closed form involving only the expected current payoff of the risky arm and the expected full-information payoff, given current information. The separability condition holds in a variety of models that have been explored in the literature, all of which assume that the risky arm's expected payoff per unit of time is time-invariant and actual payoffs are generated by a process with independent and stationary increments. The separability condition does not hold when the expected payoff per unit of time is subject to state-switching.
Strategic Experimentation
Two-Armed Bandit
Markov-Perfect Equilibrium
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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