Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/121345 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2015
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers No. 545
Verlag: 
Bielefeld University, Center for Mathematical Economics (IMW), Bielefeld
Zusammenfassung: 
Increasing concerns about climate change have given rise to the formation of International Environmental Agreements (IEAs) as a possible solution to limit global pollution effects. In this paper, we study the stability of IEAs in a repeated game framework where we restrict to strategies which are simple and invariant to renegotiation. Our main contribution to the literature on IEAs is that we allow for heterogeneous patterns of pollution such that additional to a global effect of pollution there are local pollution effects represented by a network structure. We show that stable IEAs exist if the network structure is balanced. Too large asymmetries in the degree of local spillovers may however lead to non-existence of stable structures. The generality of our approach allows for several applications to general problems in the provision of public goods.
Schlagwörter: 
Coalition structures
Networks
International environmental agreements
Weak renegotiation-proofness
JEL: 
C72
C73
D85
F53
Q54
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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