Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/121317
Authors: 
Schulte, Elisabeth
Felgenhauer, Mike
Year of Publication: 
2015
Series/Report no.: 
Joint Discussion Paper Series in Economics 24-2015
Abstract: 
We study the effects of preselection on an expert's incentive to give truthful advice in a decision environment in which certain decisions yield more precise estimates about the expert's expertise. The introduction of a preselection stage, in which the decision maker can study the case before asking for advice, alters the expert's perception of the problem. We identify conditions under which preselection occurs in equilibrium. We show that if the expert adjusts his behavior, the option to preselect may reduce the expected utility of the decision maker.
Subjects: 
reputation
cheap talk
safe haven
JEL: 
D82
D83
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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