Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/121283 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2015
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Jena Economic Research Papers No. 2015-012
Verlag: 
Friedrich Schiller University Jena, Jena
Zusammenfassung: 
We study experimentally whether heterogeneity of behavior in the Centipede game can be interpreted as the result of a learning process of individuals with different preference types (more and less pro-social) and coarse information regarding the opponent's past behavior. We manipulate the quality of information feedbacks provided after each play. If subjects rely only on their personal database, long run behavior resembles a Self-confirming equi- librium whereby less pro-social types take at earlier nodes due to prediction errors. Aggregate information release decreases heterogeneity of behavior by increasing the passing rates of pro-selfs and play moves towards Bayesian Nash equilibrium.
Schlagwörter: 
social preferences
learning
Self-confirming equilibrium
experiment
JEL: 
C71
C73
C91
D83
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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