Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/121061
Authors: 
Buccella, Domenico
Year of Publication: 
2011
Series/Report no.: 
FIW Working Paper 61
Abstract: 
This paper investigates the coordination of bargaining activities among labor unions in a Multinational Enterprise (MNE) with plants in different countries. Making use of a threestage game where the parties sequentially decide whether o coordinate negotiations, it derives the bargaining regimes arising as sub-game perfect equilibria. In presence of workers perfect substitutes in production and symmetry in the plants' efficiency, it is shown that unions' transaction costs may attenuate the conflict of interests among the parties as regards the level of coordination at which negotiations should take place.
Subjects: 
bargaining
Multinational Enterprises
labor unions
JEL: 
C78
F23
J51
D60
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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