Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/121051
Authors: 
Buccella, Domenico
Year of Publication: 
2010
Series/Report no.: 
FIW Working Paper 50
Abstract: 
This paper deals with firms' decision related to international activities in a twocountry oligopoly model with a homogeneous product and unionized labor markets. Using a three-stage non-cooperative game with firms being first movers, it is found that firms' strategies are affected by the scale of fixed costs of direct investments, trade costs and union wage strategies in labor markets, giving rise to different productive structures in equilibrium. Scopes and incentives for unions' collusion are analyzed. The consequences on national welfare levels of both unions and firms' strategic behavior are also investigated, deriving some policy insights.
Subjects: 
Foreign Direct Investment
International trade
Collusion
Labor unions
JEL: 
F16
F21
F23
J51
L13
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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