Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/120982
Authors: 
Kwiek, Maksymilian
Marreiros, Helia
Vlassopoulos, Michael
Year of Publication: 
2015
Series/Report no.: 
IZA Discussion Papers 9336
Abstract: 
A conclave is a voting mechanism in which a committee selects an alternative by voting until a sufficient supermajority is reached. We study experimentally welfare properties of simple three-voter conclaves with privately known preferences over two outcomes and waiting costs. The resulting game is a form of multiplayer war of attrition. Our key finding is that, consistent with theoretical predictions, when voters are ex ante heterogeneous in terms of the intensity of their preferences the conclave leads to efficiency gains relative to simple majority voting. We also compare welfare properties of a static versus a dynamic version of a conclave. When social cost of waiting is taken into account, the dynamic conclave is superior in terms of welfare than its static version.
Subjects: 
voting
supermajority
intensity of preferences
war of attrition
JEL: 
C78
C92
D72
D74
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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