Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/120864
Autoren: 
Chlaß, Nadine
Riener, Gerhard
Datum: 
2015
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
DICE Discussion Paper No. 196
Zusammenfassung: 
We study individuals who can choose how to compete with an opponent for one nonzero payoff. They can either nudge themselves into a fair set of rules where they have the same information and actions as their opponent, or into unfair rules where they spy, sabotage or fabricate their opponent's action. In an experiment, we observe significant altruism under rules which allow for fabrication and sabotage, but not under rules which allow for spying. We provide direct evidence that this altruism emanates from an ethical concern about the rules of the game. How individuals deal with this concern - whether they nudge themselves into fabrication-free, spying-free, or sabotage-free rules, or whether they assume the power to fabricate or sabotage to compensate their opponent by giving all payoff away - varies along with individuals' attitudes towards power.
Schlagwörter: 
moral judgement
psychological games
institutional design
lying aversion
sabotage aversion
spying aversion
unfair competition
JEL: 
D02
D03
D63
D64
ISBN: 
978-3-86304-195-3
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
1.22 MB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.