Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/120864
Authors: 
Chlaß, Nadine
Riener, Gerhard
Year of Publication: 
2015
Series/Report no.: 
DICE Discussion Paper 196
Abstract: 
We study individuals who can choose how to compete with an opponent for one nonzero payoff. They can either nudge themselves into a fair set of rules where they have the same information and actions as their opponent, or into unfair rules where they spy, sabotage or fabricate their opponent's action. In an experiment, we observe significant altruism under rules which allow for fabrication and sabotage, but not under rules which allow for spying. We provide direct evidence that this altruism emanates from an ethical concern about the rules of the game. How individuals deal with this concern - whether they nudge themselves into fabrication-free, spying-free, or sabotage-free rules, or whether they assume the power to fabricate or sabotage to compensate their opponent by giving all payoff away - varies along with individuals' attitudes towards power.
Subjects: 
moral judgement
psychological games
institutional design
lying aversion
sabotage aversion
spying aversion
unfair competition
JEL: 
D02
D03
D63
D64
ISBN: 
978-3-86304-195-3
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.