Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/120448
Authors: 
Matousek, Jindrich
Cingl, Lubomir
Year of Publication: 
2015
Series/Report no.: 
IES Working Paper 20/2015
Abstract: 
We experimentally examine the attributes of two complex multi-unit auction mechanisms in the presence of an opportunity to collude among bidding participants due to a provision of a simple communication channel. The results suggest that the combinatorial bidding format does not bring higher efficiency. Allowing for communication increases efficiency in both examined auction formats. Bidders are able to split the auctioned goods in a cheap-talk collusive agreement, which results in a better allocation compared to the auction formats without the communication channel. Combinatorial bidding on packages makes the decision-making problem of bidders hard to process and cause inefficiencies, especially for designs with the large number of auctioned goods.
Subjects: 
Combinatorial Auction
Communication
Collusion
Experiment
JEL: 
C91
D43
D44
L96
Document Type: 
Working Paper
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