Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/120441
Authors: 
Turnovec, František
Year of Publication: 
2015
Series/Report no.: 
IES Working Paper 11/2015
Abstract: 
In this paper the concepts of manipulation as strategic voting (misrepresentation of true preferences) and strategic nomination (by adding, or removing alternatives) are investigated. The connection between Arrow's and Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorems is discussed from the viewpoint of dilemma between dictatorship and manipulability.
Subjects: 
arrow's theorem
dictatorship
Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem
manipulation
Pareto efficiency
strategic voting
strategic nomination
JEL: 
D71
Document Type: 
Working Paper
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