Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/119856
Authors: 
Valente, Marco
Year of Publication: 
2015
Series/Report no.: 
LEM Working Paper Series 2015/13
Abstract: 
Selection procedures for new recruits in research organizations, supposedly aiming at identifying the candidates with the highest potential, relies necessarily on indirect information concerning the quality of a researcher. It is safe to assume that this information is correlated to, but not coinciding with, the un-observable future contributions of the candidates to a position. We show that using exceedingly selective criteria operating on observable proxy indicators of research quality may hinder the overall goal to ensure the highest expected research quality in the hiring organization. The paper presents a simple abstract model showing how pursuing the absolute best is a strategy very likely to produce results worse than alternative approaches, humbly aiming at identifying the good.
Subjects: 
Simulation models
Research assessment
Management of academic institutions
JEL: 
A14
H10
C63
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size
289.66 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.