Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/119830
Authors: 
Dosi, Giovanni
Fagiolo, Giorgio
Napoletano, Mauro
Roventini, Andrea
Treibich, Tania
Year of Publication: 
2014
Series/Report no.: 
LEM Working Paper Series 2014/07
Abstract: 
In this paper we explore the effects of alternative combinations of fiscal and monetary policies under different income distribution regimes. In particular, we aim at evaluating fiscal rules in economies subject to banking crises and deep recessions. We do so using an agent-based model populated by heterogeneous capital- and consumption-go od firms, heterogeneous banks, workers/consumers, a Central Bank and a Government. We show that the model is able to reproduce a wide array of macro and micro empirical regularities, including stylised facts concerning financial dynamics and banking crises. Simulation results suggest that the most appropriate policy mix to stabilise the economy requires unconstrained counter-cyclical fiscal policies, where automatic stabilisers are free to dampen business cycles fluctuations, and a monetary policy targeting also employment. Instead, "discipline-guided" fiscal rules such as the Stability and Growth Pact or the Fiscal Compact in the Eurozone always depress the economy, without improving public finances, even when escape clauses in case of recessions are considered. Consequently, austerity policies appear to be in general self-defeating. Furthermore, we show that the negative effects of austere fiscal rules are magnified by conservative monetary policies focused on inflation stabilisation only. Finally, the effects of monetary and fiscal policies become sharper as the level of income inequality increases.
Subjects: 
agent-based model
fiscal policy
monetary policy
banking crises
income inequality
austerity policies
disequilibrium dynamics
JEL: 
C63
E32
E6
E52
G01
G21
O4
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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