Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/119714
Authors: 
Imai, Haruo
Horie, Mayumi
Year of Publication: 
2002
Series/Report no.: 
Nota di Lavoro, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei 106.2002
Abstract: 
Based on a result due to Ray and Vohra showing the possibility of inefficiency due to a coalition formation in an international emission reduction game, we consider a possibility of negotiation preceding the negotiation stage, and by means of an example, indicate that the efficiency is restored. In the equilibrium obtained, we observe a potential in which different set of coalition arises in the two stages, which could help explain what is going on in the international negotiation.
Subjects: 
Prenegotiation
coalition formation
international emission reduction game
JEL: 
C78
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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