Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/119684
Authors: 
Percoco, Marco
Year of Publication: 
2002
Series/Report no.: 
Nota di Lavoro, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei 71.2002
Abstract: 
The aim of this paper is to present an alternative methodology for discounting far distant future externalities genereted by an investment project: time-declining discount rates. First I present the experimental evidence on individuals' time-inconsistency. Second I consider the theoretical justification for using hyperbolic discounting in a simple uncertainty framework where marginal social utility is discounted hyperbolically if the investing Government believes that social wealth might increase or decrease over future period with a small probability that wealth will deteriorate below its current level.
Subjects: 
Environmental effects
project appraisal
social discounting
JEL: 
Q01
D61
H5
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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