Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/119538 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2014
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Memorandum No. 23/2014
Verlag: 
University of Oslo, Department of Economics, Oslo
Zusammenfassung: 
We investigate a multi-period contest model in which a contestant.s present success gives an advantage over a rival in the future. How this win advantage affects contestants.efforts, and whether the laggard gives up or keep on fighting are key issues. We find that the expected effort of the laggard will always be higher than the rival at some stage in the series of contests, and this is most likely to happen when at a large disadvantage or at a late stage in the series.
Schlagwörter: 
win advantage
motivation
contest
discouragement
JEL: 
D74
D72
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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