Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/119455
Authors: 
Brühn, Tim
Götz, Georg
Year of Publication: 
2015
Series/Report no.: 
Joint Discussion Paper Series in Economics 18-2015
Abstract: 
This paper analyzes exclusionary conduct of platforms in two-sided markets. Motivated by recent antitrust cases against shopping centers introducing radius restrictions on their tenants, we provide a discussion of the likely positive and normative effects of exclusivity clauses, which prevent tenants from opening outlets in other shopping centers covered by the clause. In a standard two-sided market model with two competing shopping centers, we analyze incentives to introduce exclusivity clauses and the likely effects on social welfare. We show that exclusivity agreements are especially profitable for shopping centers and detrimental to social welfare if competition is intense between the two shopping centers. We argue that the focus of courts on market definition is misplaced in markets determined by competitive bottlenecks.
Subjects: 
platform competition
exclusive dealing
network effects
competitive bottlenecks
JEL: 
D43
D62
L13
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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