Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/119417 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2014
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Discussion Paper No. 1575
Verlag: 
Northwestern University, Kellogg School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, Evanston, IL
Zusammenfassung: 
Cooperative concepts of renegotiation in repeated games have typically assumed that Paretoranked equilibria could not coexist within the same renegotiation-proof set. With explicit renegotiation, however, a proposal to move to a Pareto-superior equilibrium can be deterred by a different continuation equilibrium which harms the proposer and rewards the refuser. This paper introduces a simple protocol of renegotiation for repeated games and defines the stability of social norms and renegotiation-proof outcomes in terms of a simple equilibrium refinement. We provide distinct necessary and sufficient conditions for renegotiation-proofness, which converge to each other as renegotiation frictions become negligible. Renegotiation-proof outcomes always exist and can be all included within a single, most permissive social norm that is straightforward to characterize graphically.
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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