Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/119412
Authors: 
Egorov, Georgy
Harstad, Bård
Year of Publication: 
2015
Series/Report no.: 
Discussion Paper, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science 1580
Abstract: 
Private politics are often introduced by market participants in the absence of public regulation. But when is private politics enough, efficient, or better than administratively costly public regulation? We present a novel framework in which we can study the interaction between regulation, self-regulation by the firm, and boycotts by the activists in a dynamic game. Our main results are the following. (i) The possibility to self-regulate saves on administrative costs, it therefore also leads to delays. (ii) The possibility to self-regulate benefits activists but harms the firm without the public regulator in place, the reverse is true with the regulator being present in the game. (iii) Without the public regulator, a boycott raises the likelihood of self-regulation, whereas if the regulator is present, it raises the likelihood of public regulation. (iv) Activism is a strategic complement to self-regulation, but a strategic substitute to public regulation. (v) In addition, the analysis generates a rich set of testable predictions regarding the regulatory outcomes and the duration of boycotts.
Subjects: 
private politics
boycotts
war of attrition
activism
regulation
self-regulation
corporate social responsibility (CSR)
JEL: 
D78
L31
L51
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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