Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/119410
Authors: 
Jullien, Bruno
Pavan, Alessandro
Year of Publication: 
2014
Series/Report no.: 
Discussion Paper, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science 1568R
Abstract: 
We study monopoly and duopoly pricing in a two-sided market with dispersed information about users' preferences. First, we show how the dispersion of information introduces idiosyncratic uncertainty about participation rates and how the latter shapes the elasticity of the demands and thereby the equilibrium prices. We then study informative advertising campaigns affecting the agents' ability to estimate their own as well as other agents' valuations, and product design affecting the distribution of valuations on the two sides of the market.
Subjects: 
two-sided markets
dispersed information
platform competition
global-games
informative advertising
JEL: 
D82
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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