Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/118650 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2015
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
CFR Working Paper No. 15-13
Verlag: 
University of Cologne, Centre for Financial Research (CFR), Cologne
Zusammenfassung: 
We investigate the nature and extent of information asymmetry among traders in companies with government ownership. Consistent with a less transparent information environment, we find relatively less informed trading in the shares of firms with government presence, and specifically, fewer informed trades related to the skilled analysis of public information. At the same time, we also find that firms with government presence have a significantly higher proportion of informed trading that arises from explicitly private information, consistent with the literature on the self-serving influence of government stakeholders not necessarily committed to maximizing firm value.
Schlagwörter: 
Government ownership
Privatization
Information asymmetry
Informed trading
Private information
JEL: 
G32
D82
L33
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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