Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/118650
Authors: 
Borisova, Ginka
Yadav, Pradeep K.
Year of Publication: 
2015
Series/Report no.: 
CFR Working Paper 15-13
Abstract: 
We investigate the nature and extent of information asymmetry among traders in companies with government ownership. Consistent with a less transparent information environment, we find relatively less informed trading in the shares of firms with government presence, and specifically, fewer informed trades related to the skilled analysis of public information. At the same time, we also find that firms with government presence have a significantly higher proportion of informed trading that arises from explicitly private information, consistent with the literature on the self-serving influence of government stakeholders not necessarily committed to maximizing firm value.
Subjects: 
Government ownership
Privatization
Information asymmetry
Informed trading
Private information
JEL: 
G32
D82
L33
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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