Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/118557 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2006
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
46th Congress of the European Regional Science Association: "Enlargement, Southern Europe and the Mediterranean", August 30th - September 3rd, 2006, Volos, Greece
Verlag: 
European Regional Science Association (ERSA), Louvain-la-Neuve
Zusammenfassung: 
This paper aims at presenting a simple model of local decision-making based on the hypothesis of monopoly power on the part of local governments. It adds the contribution of the principal-agent theory by assuming that: (a) monopolistic behavior is constrained by voters' efforts to monitor the outcomes of policies; (b) local governments' policies affect local property values. Given those assumptions, the degree of capitalization of property taxes is shown to determine the incentive for voters' control over policies' outcomes.
Dokumentart: 
Conference Paper

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