Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/118150
Authors: 
Cartwright, Edward
Wooders, Myrna
Year of Publication: 
2003
Series/Report no.: 
Nota di Lavoro, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei 123.2003
Abstract: 
Interpret a set of players all playing the same pure strategy and all with similar attributes as a society. Is it consistent with self interested behaviour for a population to organise itself into a relatively small number of societies? In a companion paper we characterised how large e must be, in terms of parameters describing individual games, for an equilibrium to exhibit conformity in pure strategies. In this paper we provide a wide class of games where such conformity is boundedly rational, that is, where can be chosen to be small.
Subjects: 
Conformity
Bounded Rationality
JEL: 
C70
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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