Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/118144
Authors: 
Laukkanen, Marita
Year of Publication: 
2003
Series/Report no.: 
Nota di Lavoro, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei 118.2003
Abstract: 
This paper examines how non-binding co-operative agreements on marine fisheries management can be sustained when management plans in participating countries are implemented with error. The effects of implementation uncertainty on voluntary co-operation are compared to those of recruitment uncertainty. A self-enforcing co-operative solution can only be sustained when uncertainty is not too pronounced. Even when a co-operative agreement can be achieved, frequent phases of reversion to non-co-operative harvest levels are needed to support the agreement. The implications of recruitment uncertainty for implicit co-operation are less detrimental than those of implementation uncertainty.
Subjects: 
Fisheries management
Transboundary fisheries
Non-cooperative games
Implementation uncertainty
JEL: 
Q22
C72
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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