Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/118131
Authors: 
Buchner, Barbara
Carraro, Carlo
Year of Publication: 
2003
Series/Report no.: 
Nota di Lavoro, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei 104.2003
Abstract: 
This paper analyses whether different emissions trading regimes provide different incentives to participate in a cooperative climate agreement. Different incentive structures are discussed for those countries, namely the US, Russia and China, that are most important in the climate negotiation process. Our analysis confirms the conjecture that, by appropriately designing the emission trading regime, it is possible to enhance the incentives to participate in a climate agreement. Therefore, participation and optimal policy should be jointly analysed. Moreover, our results show that the US, Russia and China have different most preferred climate coalitions and therefore adopt conflicting negotiation strategies.
Subjects: 
Agreements
Climate
Incentives
Negotiations
Policy
JEL: 
C72
H23
Q25
Q28
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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