Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/118120
Authors: 
Finus, Michael
Eyckmans, Johan
Year of Publication: 
2003
Series/Report no.: 
Nota di Lavoro, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei 88.2003
Abstract: 
We analyze with an integrated assessment model of climate change the formation of interna-tional environmental agreements (IEAs) by applying the widely used concept of inter-nal & external stability and several modifications of it. We relax the assumptions of a single agreement and open membership rule. It turns out that regional agreements are superior to a single agreement and exclusive is superior to open membership in welfare and ecological terms. Moreover, we show the importance of transfers for successful treaty-making. We relate our results to the design of current and past IEAs as well as to other issues of international policy coordination.
Subjects: 
Design of climate treaty protocol
Coalition formation
Non-cooperative game theory
JEL: 
C68
C72
H41
Q25
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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