Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/118115
Authors: 
Brams, Steven J.
Jones, Michael A.
Kilgour, D.Marc
Year of Publication: 
2003
Series/Report no.: 
Nota di Lavoro, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei 97.2003
Abstract: 
Players are assumed to rank each other as coalition partners. Two processes of coalition formation are defined and illustrated: i) Fallback (FB): Players seek coalition partners by descending lower and lower in their preference rankings until some majority coalition, all of whose members consider each other mutually acceptable, forms. ii) Build-up (BU):Same descent as FB, except only majorities whose members rank each other highest form coalitions. BU coalitions are stable in the sense that no member would prefer to be in another coalition, whereas FB coalitions, whose members need not rank each other highest, may not be stable. BU coalitions are bimodally distributed in a random society, with peaks around simple majority and unanimity the distributions of majorities in the US Supreme Count and in the US House of Representatives follow this pattern. The dynamics of real-life coalition-formation processes are illustrated by two Supreme Court cases.
Subjects: 
Coalition dynamics
Fallback bargaining
Manipulability
Legislatures
US Supreme Court
JEL: 
D72
C78
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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