Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/118082
Authors: 
Kóczy, László Á.
Lauwers, Luc
Year of Publication: 
2003
Series/Report no.: 
Nota di Lavoro, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei 50.2003
Abstract: 
A set of outcomes for a TU-game in characteristic function form is dominant if it is, with respect to an outsider-independent dominance relation, accessible (or admissible) and closed. This outsider-independent dominance relation is restrictive in the sense that a deviating coalition cannot determine the payoffs of those coalitions that are not involved in the deviation. The minimal (for inclusion) dominant set is non-empty and for a game with a non-empty coalition structure core, the minimal dominant set returns this core.
Subjects: 
Core
Non-emptiness
Indirect dominance
Outsider-independence
JEL: 
C71
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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