Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/118063
Authors: 
Finus, Michael
Rundshagen, Bianca
Year of Publication: 
2003
Series/Report no.: 
Nota di Lavoro, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei 31.2003
Abstract: 
We identify the core as an appealing stability concept of cooperative game theory, but argue that the non-cooperative approach has conceptual advantages in the context of economic problems with externalities. Therefore, we derive a non-cooperative foundation of core-stability for positive externality NTU-games. First, in the spirit of Hart/Kurz (1983), we develop a game that we call ?-game and show that strong Nash equilibria coalition structures in this game are identical to ?- and ?-core stable coalition structures. Second, as a by-product of the definition of the ?-game, we develop an extension called an ?-game. Finally, we compare equilibria in the ?- and ?-game with those in the ?- and ?-game of Hart and Kurz (1983).
Subjects: 
Core-stability
non-cooperative game theory
positive externality games
JEL: 
C72
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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