Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/118054
Authors: 
Boubakri, Narjess
Cosset, Jean-Claude
Guedhami, Omrane
Year of Publication: 
2003
Series/Report no.: 
Nota di Lavoro, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei 37.2003
Abstract: 
We investigate the role of ownership structure and investor protection in postprivatization corporate governance. We find that the government relinquishes control over time, mainly to the benefit of local institutions and foreign investors. We also show that private ownership tends to concentrate over time. In addition to firm-level variables, investor protection, political and social stability explain the cross-firm differences in ownership concentration. We find that the positive effect of ownership concentration on firm performance matters more in countries with weak investor protection and that private domestic ownership leads to higher performance.
Subjects: 
Corporate governance
privatization
performance
JEL: 
G32
G38
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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