Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/117982
Authors: 
Boerner, Kira
Year of Publication: 
2004
Series/Report no.: 
Nota di Lavoro, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei 106.2004
Abstract: 
International organizations promote privatization as precondition for economic development. But is there really too little privatization? This political economy model asks for the incentives of governments to privatize or restructure a state-owned firm. Different government types are compared to identify the political and institutional determinants of privatization. Under privatization, governments commit not to in influence the profit-maximizing employment choice by private investors. With respect to the social optimum, both voter-oriented and egoistic governments can have inefficiently high incentives to privatize. When this is the case, outside pressure to privatize is detrimental. An improving institutional environment reduces these inefficiencies.
Subjects: 
Political incentives
Privatization
Restructuring
Employment
JEL: 
D72
D73
H82
L33
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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