Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/117971
Authors: 
Izmalkov, Sergei
Year of Publication: 
2004
Series/Report no.: 
Nota di Lavoro, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei 91.2004
Abstract: 
This paper presents an open ascending price mechanism that allocates efficiently M units of the same good among N bidders with interdependent values The mechanism consists of a number of sequential English auctions with reentry and has the following attributes. In each of the individual auctions all the bidders compete simultaneously in the open ascending price format. The most distinctive feature of the mechanism is that winners are determined first, and then additional auxillary auctions are conducted to determine prices. The total number of auctions depends only on the number of goods to be allocated and not on the number of bidders.
Subjects: 
Multiple units
Interdependent values
Sequential auctions
Ascending price auction
JEL: 
C72
D44
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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