Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/117922
Authors: 
Escrihuela-Villar, Marc
Year of Publication: 
2004
Series/Report no.: 
Nota di Lavoro, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei 44.2004
Abstract: 
The paper studies how does the size of a cartel affect the possibility that its members can sustain a collusive agreement. I obtain that collusion is easier to sustain the larger the cartel is. Then, I explore the implications of this result on the incentives of firms to participate in a cartel. Firms will be more willing to participate because otherwise, they risk that collusion completely collapses, as remaining cartel members are unable to sustain collusion.
Subjects: 
Collusion
Partial cartels
Trigger strategies
Optimal punishment
JEL: 
L11
L13
L41
D43
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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