Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/117881 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2004
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Nota di Lavoro No. 2.2004
Verlag: 
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM), Milano
Zusammenfassung: 
In this paper we consider a model with two industrialised countries and immigrants that come from “the rest of the world”. The countries are distinguished on the basis of three parameters: population size, bias towards immigrants, and production complementarity between native population and immigrants. We consider a non-cooperative game where each country makes a strategic choice of its immigration quotas. We first show that our game admits a unique pure strategy Nash equilibrium and then study the welfare implications of countries' choices. It turns out that a county with a higher degree of production complementarity and a higher level of tolerance towards immigrants would allow a larger immigration quota and achieve a higher welfare level. Our results call for coordinated and harmonised immigration policies that may improve the welfare of both countries.
Schlagwörter: 
Immigration quotas
Heterogeneity
Production complementarity
Welfare
Policy Harmonisation
JEL: 
C72
F22
O3
R1
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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