Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/117305 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2015
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
DICE Discussion Paper No. 194
Verlag: 
Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE), Düsseldorf
Zusammenfassung: 
In the economic analysis of liability law, information about accident risk and how it can be influenced by precautions is commonly taken for granted. However, a profound understanding of the relationship between care and accident risk often requires learning-by-doing. In a two-period model, we examine the implications for the optimal level of care and behavior under strict liability and negligence, showing that liability law may not induce efficient incentives.
Schlagwörter: 
liability rules
care incentives
accident technology
JEL: 
K13
D62
D83
ISBN: 
978-3-86304-193-9
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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