Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/117305
Authors: 
Baumann, Florian
Friehe, Tim
Year of Publication: 
2015
Series/Report no.: 
DICE Discussion Paper 194
Abstract: 
In the economic analysis of liability law, information about accident risk and how it can be influenced by precautions is commonly taken for granted. However, a profound understanding of the relationship between care and accident risk often requires learning-by-doing. In a two-period model, we examine the implications for the optimal level of care and behavior under strict liability and negligence, showing that liability law may not induce efficient incentives.
Subjects: 
liability rules
care incentives
accident technology
JEL: 
K13
D62
D83
ISBN: 
978-3-86304-193-9
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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