Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/117232 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2004
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
44th Congress of the European Regional Science Association: "Regions and Fiscal Federalism", 25th - 29th August 2004, Porto, Portugal
Verlag: 
European Regional Science Association (ERSA), Louvain-la-Neuve
Zusammenfassung: 
This paper aims at presenting a simple model of local decision-making based on the hypothesis of “constrained” monopoly power on the part of local governments. It adds the contribution of the principal-agent theory by assuming that: (a) monopolistic behavior is constrained by voters’ efforts to monitor the outcomes of policies; (b) local governments’ policies affect local property values. An empirical test of the model for the Portuguese local authorities indicates that the hypothesis of “monitoring” may be accepted and that of capitalization can only be accepted in relation to local public services not to local taxes on property.
Dokumentart: 
Conference Paper

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