Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/115908 
Year of Publication: 
2003
Series/Report no.: 
43rd Congress of the European Regional Science Association: "Peripheries, Centres, and Spatial Development in the New Europe", 27th - 30th August 2003, Jyväskylä, Finland
Publisher: 
European Regional Science Association (ERSA), Louvain-la-Neuve
Abstract: 
Firstly, this paper aims at building a theoretical framework in order to explain opportunistic local public behaviors on the eve of elections. The resulting electoral cycle depends on the tax shape, the avalability to contract loans, and the shape of the demand for public goods. In particular, the model predicts a tax cut during the election period in French municipalities. Indebtedness may lead to an electoral cycle on public spending provided that the public good demand is elastic enough. Secondly, empirical investigation relying on a dynamic panel data model confirms theoretical predictions.
Document Type: 
Conference Paper

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