Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/115536 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2015
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
IDB Working Paper Series No. IDB-WP-593
Verlag: 
Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), Washington, DC
Zusammenfassung: 
This paper investigates the effects of political (mis)alignment on public service delivery when mandates are shared between state and local governments. We analyze sewage treatment policies in the state of São Paulo, Brazil. Relying on difference-in-differences estimations, we establish a causal relationship between political alignment and higher sewage treatment provision. Conceptually, we find that, with uncertain local commitment and weakly enforceable local obligations, shared mandates lead to a moral hazard issue implying service under-provision. Our results show that political alignment attenuates such moral hazard effects.
Schlagwörter: 
political alignment
infrastructure provision
water and sanitary services
moral hazard
Brazil
JEL: 
H40
H54
H72
P48
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Dokumentart: 
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