Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/115395 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2011
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
IDB Working Paper Series No. IDB-WP-264
Verlag: 
Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), Washington, DC
Zusammenfassung: 
We analyze the outcomes of 332 cases from a labor court in Mexico in which a judge awarded money to a plaintiff who claimed to have been fired by a firm without cause. The judgments were enforced in only 40% of the cases. A plaintiff may try to enforce a judgment by petitioning the court to seize the firm's assets when the firm refuses to pay. Thirty eight percent of the enforced judgments required at least one seizure attempt. We estimate the parameters of post judgment games in which the worker does not know if a seizure attempt would ultimately succeed and show that these models explain the data well. We then simulate the effects of a policy that reduces worker costs of a seizure attempt. We find that this policy would increase the probability of enforcement, either by increasing the probability that the worker attempts an asset seizure or by inducing firms to pay voluntarily to avoid such seizure attempts. However, reducing worker costs of seizure attempts can only have a modest effect on enforcement probabilities because a high percentage of firms are able to avoid payment in spite of worker efforts to force collection.
Schlagwörter: 
Labor Courts
Mexico
Severance Payments
Enforcement of Labor Law
JEL: 
J65
K31
K41
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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