Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/115039
Authors: 
Fellner, Gerlinde
Sausgruber, Rupert
Traxler, Christian
Year of Publication: 
2009
Series/Report no.: 
NRN Working Paper, NRN: The Austrian Center for Labor Economics and the Analysis of the Welfare State 0923
Abstract: 
We run a large-scale natural field experiment to evaluate alternative strategies to en- force compliance with the law. The experiment varies the text of mailings sent to potential evaders of TV license fees. We find a strong alert effect of mailings, leading to a substantial increase in compliance. Among different mailing conditions a legal threat that stresses a high detection risk has a significant and highly robust deterrent effect. Neither appealing to morals nor imparting information about others' behavior enhances compliance. However, the information condition has a positive effect in municipalities where evasion is believed to be common. Overall, the economic model of crime performs remarkably well in explaining our data.
Subjects: 
Field experiments
law enforcement
compliance
deterrence
JEL: 
K42
C93
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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