Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/114669
Authors: 
Goon, Robert
Teall, John L.
Year of Publication: 
1994
Citation: 
[Journal:] Journal of Small Business Finance [ISSN:] 1057-2287 [Volume:] 3 [Year:] 1994 [Issue:] 2 [Pages:] 127-139
Abstract: 
The one-share, one-vote rule applicable to the governance of most business firms provides for proportional voting power which differs substantially from proportional shareholdings of investors. This problem is particularly acute in small firms where several (or many) shareholders may hold significant proportions of shares. This paper reviews well-known game theoretic algorithms (weighting or vote assignment schemes) for the alignment of power with proportional shareholdings. It also provides a simple measure of the “misalignment of power from proportional shareholdings” and discusses its application in determining more equitable vote reassignment schemes.
Subjects: 
Voting
Governance
One-Share One-Vote
Cumulative Voting
Small Firm
Small Business
JEL: 
L25
G34
G32
Document Type: 
Article

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