Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/114470
Authors: 
Agarwal, Vikas
Ma, Linlin
Mullally, Kevin
Year of Publication: 
2015
Series/Report no.: 
CFR Working Paper 13-10 [rev.]
Abstract: 
We examine the determinants and consequences of mutual fund managers simultaneously managing multiple funds. Well-performing managers multitask by taking over poorly performing funds or launching new funds. Subsequent to multitasking, funds run by managers prior to multitasking (i.e., incumbent funds) experience performance deterioration while the performance of the acquired funds improves. Multitasking increases the assets of fund companies but results in a wealth transfer from shareholders of the incumbent funds to those of the funds the managers take over. Multitasking arrangements are terminated when investors recognize the associated agency problem and withdraw their capital from the incumbent funds.
Subjects: 
Multitasking
Fund Performance
Fund Flows
Agency Problems
JEL: 
G10
G20
G23
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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