Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/114173 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2015
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
ZEW Discussion Papers No. 15-053
Verlag: 
Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW), Mannheim
Zusammenfassung: 
Contrary to previous literature we hypothesize that interests of labor may well - like that of shareholders - aim at securing the long-run survival of the firm. Consequently, employee representatives on the supervisory board could well have an interest in increasing incentive-based compensation to avoid excessive risk taking and short-run orientated decisions. We compile unique panel data on executive compensation over the periods 2006 to 2011 for 405 listed companies and use a Hausman-Taylor approach to estimate the effect of codetermination on the compensation design. Finally, codetermination has a significantly positive effect on performance-based components of compensation, which supports our hypothesis.
Schlagwörter: 
Executive Compensation
Codetermination
Principal-Agent Theory
Corporate Governance
Hausman-Taylor
JEL: 
J52
L20
G32
M12
C33
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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