Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/114117
Authors: 
Cubitt, Robin
Gächter, Simon
Quercia, Simone
Year of Publication: 
2015
Series/Report no.: 
IZA Discussion Papers 9241
Abstract: 
We investigate whether there is a link between conditional cooperation and betrayal aversion. We use a public goods game to classify subjects by type of contribution preference and by belief about the contributions of others; and we measure betrayal aversion for different categories of subject. We find that, among conditional cooperators, only those who expect others to contribute little to the public good are significantly betrayal averse, while there is no evidence of betrayal aversion for those who expect substantial contributions by others. This is consistent with their social risk taking in public goods games, as the pessimistic conditional cooperators tend to avoid contribution to avoid exploitation, whereas the optimistic ones typically contribute to the public good and thus take the social risk of being exploited.
Subjects: 
exploitation aversion
betrayal aversion
trust
conditional cooperation
public goods game
free riding
experiments
JEL: 
H41
C91
C72
D03
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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