Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/114026
Authors: 
Bakshi, Dripto
Dasgupta, Indraneel
Year of Publication: 
2015
Series/Report no.: 
IZA Discussion Papers 9159
Abstract: 
We model an infinitely repeated Tullock contest, over the sharing of some given resource, between two ethnic groups. The resource is allocated by a composite state institution according to relative ethnic control; hence the ethnic groups contest the extent of institutional ethnic bias. The contest yields the per-period relative influence over institutions, which partly spills over into the next period, by affecting relative conflict efficiency. Our model generates non-monotone evolution of both conflict and distribution. Results suggest that external interventions, when effective in reducing current conflict and protecting weaker groups, may end up sowing the seeds of greater future conflict.
Subjects: 
ethnocracy
ethnic conflict
dynamic contest
rent-seeking
inter-temporal productivity carryover
JEL: 
D72
D74
O10
O20
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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