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Erscheinungsjahr: 
2015
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
IZA Discussion Papers No. 9113
Verlag: 
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA), Bonn
Zusammenfassung: 
We study the political economy of policy innovations during the U.S. welfare reform in 1996. Specifically, we investigate how reputation concerns among governors influence the decision to experiment with welfare policies. In line with a political agency model, our empirical results suggest that governors with high reputation among the electorate are less likely to experiment with welfare policies than governors with low reputation. Yet, governors with high reputation who are less concerned about reelection actually experiment more than governors striving for reelection. Overall, our findings imply that reelection concerns may inhibit innovation in the public sector.
Schlagwörter: 
policy innovation
reputation concerns
U.S. welfare reform
experimentation
reelection concerns
JEL: 
I38
H11
H77
D78
D83
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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