Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/113974
Authors: 
Lambertini, Luca
Poyago-Theotoky, Joanna
Tampieri, Alessandro
Year of Publication: 
2015
Series/Report no.: 
Nota di Lavoro, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei 73.2015
Abstract: 
We examine the relationship between competition and innovation in an industry where production is polluting and R&D aims to reduce emissions ("green" innovation). We present an n-firm oligopoly where firms compete in quantities and decide their investment in "green" R&D. When environmental taxation is exogenous, aggregate R&D investment always increases with the number of firms in the industry. Next we analyse the case where the emission tax is set endogenously by a regulator (committed or time-consistent) with the aim to maximise social welfare. We show that an inverted-U relationship exists between aggregate R&D and industry size under reasonable conditions, and is driven by the presence of R&D spillovers.
Subjects: 
"Green" R&D
R&D Spillovers
Emission Taxation
Time-Consistent Emission Tax
Pre-Commited Emission Tax
JEL: 
Q55
Q56
O30
L13
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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