Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/113967
Authors: 
Nieva, Ricardo
Year of Publication: 
2015
Series/Report no.: 
Nota di Lavoro, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei 67.2015
Abstract: 
We consider a standard coalitional bargaining game where once a coalition forms it exits as in Okada (2011), however, instead of alternating offers, we have simultaneous payoff demands. We focus in the producer game he studies. Each player is chosen with equal probability. If that is the case, she can choose any coalition she belongs to. However, a coalition can form if an only if payoff demands are feasible as in the Nash (1953) demand game. After smoothing the game (as in Van Damme (1991)), when the noise vanishes, when the discount factor is close to 1, and as in Okada's (2011), the coalitional Nash bargaining solution is the unique stationary subgameperfect equilibrium.
Subjects: 
Coalitional Bargaining
Nash Program
Simultaneous Payoff
Demands
Uncertainty
JEL: 
C71
C72
C78
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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